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This paper theoretically and empirically evaluates the relationship between the strength of inventors’ 
motives and their productivity, and the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. For our 
empirical analyses, we use novel data from a survey of Japanese inventors on 5,278 patents 
conducted by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) in 2007 matched with 
a firm-level survey of remuneration policies for employee inventions conducted by the Institute of 
Intellectual Property (IIP) in 2005. The RIETI survey contains rich information about inventors, 
patents, and project characteristics, as well as two new measures of inventor productivity. 
Our study first reveals that satisfaction from contributing to science and technology and interest in 
solving challenging technical problems are highly associated with inventor productivity. Most 
notably, the science motivation measure has the largest and the most significant correlation with our 
measures of inventor productivity. Science orientation may be strongly associated with high R&D 
productivity because early access to scientific discoveries gives inventors an advantage or because 
interest in science correlates with inventive ability. However, careful analysis using additional 
measures of knowledge spillovers from academia and a proxy of inventor ability find little support 
for either explanation. This result makes the third explanation (science orientation) plausible, that is, 
the above two task motives simply encourage researchers to dedicate themselves to challenging 
projects. 
In order to explore further and based on our interpretation of motivation mentioned above, we 
present a principal-agent model where the agent selects the type of research projects and exerts effort 
in the presence of monetary incentives. The model offers the following two empirical implications: 
(a) firms with many intrinsically motivated employees are less likely to introduce revenue-based pay; 
and (b) the average value of patents is more positively correlated with the strength of intrinsic 
motivation in the absence of revenue-based pay than in its presence. Finally, we test the above 
empirical implications using the matched dataset from the RIETI and IIP surveys and we find little 
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I  Introduction 
Since the seminal work done by Schumpeter (1943), economists have investigated what 
determines the level of R&D efforts at the organizational level. Although we have accumulated 
substantial knowledge about how market structure, protection of intellectual property rights, and the 
existence of positive spillovers affect the level of R&D investment at the firm level, one of the most 
important resources in technological progress, efforts made by inventors themselves, has not been 
given enough attention in the literature. Note that most innovators are employed by organizations and 
much of the rent generated from the invention does not accrue to the inventor himself. This setup is a 
traditional moral hazard situation in which inventors may exert less efforts than are efficient.   
The moral hazard problem in the R&D setting is especially hard to avoid for a number of 
reasons. First, it is difficult for the management to monitor the process of R&D activities. Since 
R&D typically requires highly specialized scientific and/or technical knowledge, it is almost 
inevitable that the management will delegate real decision authority to the researchers about what 
targets to pursue, what approaches to take, and how much resources to allocate to each step. This 
means that the management cannot intervene in the day-to-day operation of their R&D projects.   
Second, the output of R&D is knowledge and technology which will be combined for commercial 
use. According to the RIETI inventor survey we use, about 80 percent of patented technology in 
commercial use is utilized conjointly with other patented technology. It is not unusual for more than 
100 patents to be bundled together to launch a new product. Therefore, it is a formidable task to 
evaluate the economic value of each piece of technical knowledge. Third, some discoveries are  
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strategically patented (e.g., for defensive reasons) with little expectation of commercial use while 
some important technologies and know-how are kept unpatented and secret to avoid disclosure. 
Therefore, simply counting the number of patents granted may not be a good measure of R&D 
performance. Fourth, most R&D processes take time and involve considerable uncertainty. It is not 
uncommon, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, for it to take ten to twenty years for some 
inventions to start generating significant revenue for the firm. Designing effective incentive contracts 
is greatly complicated by such time lags and the risk-averse nature of individuals. The difficulty of 
monitoring and evaluating the performance of R&D employees might impel firms to rely on intrinsic 
or social motives and to adopt a hands-off management approach that empowers researchers and 
reinforces their intrinsic motivations.   
In this context, it is quite important to understand what factors actually motivate inventors 
and how they interact each other. Intrinsically motivated behaviors are behaviors which a person 
engages in to feel competent and self-determining (Deci 1975) and for R&D researchers overcoming 
obstacles to contribute to the advancement of science fulfills this definition. They are also influenced 
by extrinsic motives such as career concerns, the desire to enhance their reputations inside and 
outside their organizations, and the expectation that their performance will affect their research 
funding and compensation. Social psychologists have long discussed the possible detrimental effect 
of extrinsic motivation on creativity (see, for example, Amabile 1987). Intrinsic motivation may 
stimulate creativity by supporting more challenging exploratory work while extrinsic rewards could 
suffocate creativity by drawing researchers’ attention to more incremental approaches. Social  
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psychologists have also examined the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and 
shown some evidence that extrinsic rewards could “crowd-out” intrinsic motivation under certain 
conditions (see Frey 1997, Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999, Frey and Jegen 2001, and Wiersma 
1992).  
If the “crowding-out” story holds true, striking a balance between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations is a challenging task for the firm. For example, it may be infeasible to encourage 
individuals to initiate exploratory research relying on intrinsic motives and at the same time motivate 
the same individuals to exploit the firm’s knowledge stock to accelerate incremental process of 
development and commercialization through extrinsic rewards. The degree to which intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations reinforce or weaken each other has various implications for the organizational 
structure and management of R&D divisions. 
The issue of how to design the optimal monetary compensation for inventions is especially 
important for Japanese firms in the light of recent developments in domestic property rights law. 
Most Japanese firms offer some form of monetary rewards to employees who successfully develop 
patented or commercialized technology. Although Japanese patent law requires firms to pay an 
appropriate amount of monetary compensation to employee-inventors, the law does not specify how 
much is “appropriate.” As a result, the size of reward varies widely from firm to firm. In the past 
decade, a number of major Japanese firms including Nichia Chemical, Hitachi, Olympus, and 
Ajinomoto have been sued by their former inventor-employees for not compensating them enough 
and many of these firms lost their cases. In response to this new legal environment, some firms have  
 
  5
introduced additional inventor compensation packages or raised the level of rewards to avoid the risk 
of legal battles.   
In addition, the external labor market for R&D researchers and engineers is becoming 
increasingly active and their turnover rate has been gradually but steadily rising over the last decade. 
Competition is pushing innovative firms to offer more generous inventor remuneration to attract and 
retain talented researchers. We need to investigate whether this trend toward greater extrinsic 
rewards will benefit or harm R&D productivity in the Japanese firms.   
 
II  Prior Literature 
Importance of science orientation and intellectual challenge has been discussed by a number 
of economists such as Arora and Gambardella (1994), Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990), 
Gambadella et al. (2006), Sauermann and Cohen (2010), Stephan (1996), and Stern (2004). Some of 
these works have found strong correlations between science orientation and R&D productivity, but it 
has not yet been made clear whether individuals’ enthusiasm for science serves to enhance their 
R&D productivity or if enthusiasm is simply correlated with their ability. The economic significance 
of intrinsic and social motives recently attracted more attention thanks to the “paradox” of open 
source software development. Lerner and Tirole (2005) argue that open source contributors enjoy 
working on a “cool” project, derive ego gratification from peer recognition as well as skill 
improvement and can advance their careers by attracting offers of employment or venture capital 
funding.   
 
  6
As noted above, the possibility of extrinsic rewards or intervention “crowding-out” intrinsic 
motivation has been discussed by many researchers in social psychology. According to Frey (1997), 
three psychological processes contribute to the crowding-out effect of extrinsic rewards and 
intervention: individuals feel less responsible and self-determining, their self-esteem suffers from 
feeling less appreciated for their commitment and competence, and they lose the chance to exhibit 
their inner motivation. 
Although there has been much research in economics on extrinsic rewards such as explicit 
monetary incentives and promotion, studies rarely considered the role that intrinsic motives play in 
employee performance with a few exceptions including Kreps (1997), Murdock (2002) and Akerlof 
and Kranton (2005). Very recently, though, there have been some attempts to explain the 
substitutability between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation using game-theoretical models. Bénabou 
and Tirole (2003) argue that information revelation by an informed principal could cause the 
crowd-out effect. In their model, the principal (manager, teacher, parent) has some private 
information about the capability of the agent (worker, child) or the difficulty of the task. By choosing 
certain extrinsic rewards, the principal reveals this private information to the agent (e.g., the principal 
thinks that the agent lacks sufficient ability to accomplish the task easily or believes the task is more 
difficult than it looks). This revelation makes the incentive a weak reinforcer in the short run and a 
negative reinforcer in the long run.   
Another related study by Prendergast (2008) introduces the role of sorting based on the 
preferences of potential employees in the framework of multi-tasking agents. When the firm can  
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contract on outputs, it is best to hire agents who do not have biased preferences. As the precision of 
output measures deteriorates, the firm relies less on incentives and tries to hire individuals with 
stronger intrinsic motivation—people who have biased preference for certain aspects of their tasks 
which leads to the possibility of strife across different parts of the firm. The model has an empirical 
implication that is very similar to that of the crowd-out effect: the employees are less intrinsically 
motivated in the firm where strong monetary incentives are offered.   
Despite the increasing theoretical works and numerous experimental studies by 
psychologists, sociologists and economists, there have not been any systematic studies using 
real-world data. Nor have we seen empirical studies analyzing the impact of extrinsic rewards for 
R&D workers with the exception is Cohen and Sauermann (2010) who analyze the relationships 
among income, levels of effort, and innovative outputs for those with science and engineering 
degrees in the United States.   
 
 
III  Data 
We employ data from a survey of 5,091 Japanese inventors on 5,278 patents (187 inventors 
filled the survey twice on different patents) conducted by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (RIETI) in 2007. Roughly 70% of the sample comes from the pool of triadic patents 
which are simultaneously applied for in Japan, the US and Europe, while roughly 30% come from 
random sampling of non-triadic patents. Although the pool of triadic patents contains only 3% of all  
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applications submitted to the Japan Patent Office, focusing on this pool allows us to analyze mostly 
economically valuable patents. In addition, selecting triadic patents enabled us to use citation 
information provided by the US Patent Office for this portion of respondents. Some inventor and 
project characteristics as a percentage of the total sample are presented in Tables A-E.   
The RIETI survey has two advantages. First, most earlier surveys conducted in Japan were 
designed for collecting firm-level data and do not allow researchers to test inventor-level, 
project-level or even business-unit-level hypotheses. The RIETI inventor survey contains rich 
information about inventor, patent and project characteristics and is perfectly suitable for analyzing 
the work environments of employee-inventors. Second, the survey offers two new measures of 
inventor productivity, one “quantitative” and the other “qualitative.” The former is the number of 
patents the project produced or was expected to produce and the latter measure is the economic value 
of the surveyed patent evaluated on a relative basis by the inventors themselves. These measures, 
together with patent citation figures—the traditional performance measure for inventions—enable us 
to analyze hypotheses from multiple dimensions. To be more specific, we have the following two 
performance measures:   
Pat_num : the number of domestic patent grants the project is expected to generate; category 
variable: 1 (= 1 patent), 2 (2~5), 3(6~10), 4 (11~50), 5 (51~100), 6 (>100).   
Pat_val: the inventor’s ranking of the economic value of the surveyed patent among other 
comparable patents in the same technological field concurrently granted in Japan; category variable: 
1 (below average), 2 (above average), 3 (top 25 percent), 4 (top 10 percent).  
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Other important pieces of information that allow us to analyze what inventors care most 
about are their responses to the survey question, “How important was each of the following factors 
as a source of motivation for your invention?” 
1.  SCIENCE: Satisfaction from contributing to the progress of science and technology. 
2.  CHALLENGE: Satisfaction from solving challenging technical problems. 
3.  ORG_PERFORMANCE: Performance enhancement of your organization 
4.  CAREER: Career advances and better job opportunities. 
5.  REPUTATION: Reputation and prestige. 
6.  BUDGET: Improved research conditions such as more budget. 
7.  MONEY: Monetary rewards. 
The 5-point Likert scale is used to answer each question (1 = absolutely unimportant, 5 = very 
important). We regard the first two motives as intrinsic and the latter five motives as mostly extrinsic. 
Table 1 shows that there are high correlations between the two intrinsic motives and among the last 
four extrinsic motives.   
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the inventors’ rating of motives does not vary much according to 
their educational background or employer type. Nonetheless, we can derive a number of notable 
implications from the graphs. First, the higher level of degree an inventor has, the more he tends to 
attribute his motivation to advancing science and technology, solving challenging technical problems, 
enhancing his reputation, and getting more resources (see Figure 1). One caveat is that the 
differences between PhDs and other degree holders likely reflect differences in the types of  
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organization that employ them as a substantial portion of PhDs work in universities, national 
laboratories and other non-profit research institutions. As you can see in Figure 2, researchers in 
those organizations tend to value contributing to science and technology and securing better research 
conditions more highly than private sector researchers. Second, it is not surprising that self-employed 
inventors care much more about monetary compensation and less about organizational performance 
and career development than their employed counterparts. Self-employed researchers can capture a 
substantial portion of the economic rent generated by their inventions through licensing or 
commercialization while employee-inventors are typically entitled to a small amount of 
compensation under the Patent Law.  
Third, inventors in medium-sized firms seem to have less desire to advance science and 
technology or earn monetary compensation than inventors in other firms while those in small firms 
are likely to be less interested in organizational performance and career development. This finding 
indicates that the relationship between firm size and inventors’ motives may not be linear. 
 
IV  Empirical Analysis, Part 1 
  Our multivariate analysis proceeds in two steps in this section. First, we estimate ordered 
logit models to investigate how the seven motives are associated with inventor productivity measures, 
controlling for other inventor, technology, project and firm characteristics. The biggest problem in 
these estimates is self-selection. For example, some unobservable project or firm characteristics may 
affect both the types of inventors the projects attract and their productivity measures. Since we  
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cannot find any appropriate instruments to resolve this endogeneity issue, we attempt to mitigate the 
self-selection by estimating the same model with the firm fixed effect. In the second step, we 
investigate what mechanism lies behind the significant correlation between the measurements of 
intrinsic motives and our R&D performance measures. We then present a number of hypotheses and 
examine how well our data support them. 
a.  What motivates inventors? 
First, we estimate two knowledge production functions for the number of patents granted for 
inventions from a given project (Pat_num) and the subjective value of the sampled patent (pat_val). 
The econometric model we use is the following form of the ordered logit model: 
i i i i Z X y      
*      (7) 
where y
*
i is the latent variable either for the number of patents (Pat_num) or the inventor’s own 
estimate of the value of a patent (Pat_val) for each inventor-project pair i, Xi includes various 
inventor, patent, project, and firm characteristics, Zi is the inventor’s evaluation of the seven motives, 
and  i    is the error term. Table 2 shows the results when the dependent variable is the number of 
patents while Table 3 presents the results when our quality measure—the inventor’s evaluation of the 
worth of a patent—is the dependent variable. 
We learn from the first columns of Table 2 and 3 that SCIENCE and CHALLENGE are 
strongly associated with both measures of inventor productivity. SCIENCE has a higher coefficient 
than CHALLENGE for the number of patents generated while both have almost equal coefficients 
for the relative value of patents. The results should not be interpreted as showing the effect of these 
motives on R&D productivity, however, because the importance of motives is presumably 
determined endogenously. For example, it is possible that projects closer to the frontiers of science  
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tend to have higher expected values as well as attracting researchers with stronger interests in science 
or solving challenging problems. 
We also find a slight difference between the quantity and quality measures: inventors who say 
they are highly motivated by a desire to improve their research conditions, such as their funding 
levels are likely to produce more patents (column 1 in Table 2), while inventors who rate reputation 
as important are likely to produce more valuable patents (column 1 in Table 3). The former result 
may imply that in organizations which base research budgets on the amount of inventions produced, 
inventors will work to increase the number of patents rather than toward producing more valuable 
inventions. The problem can also be seen as an example of the multi-tasking agency problem 
analyzed by Milgrom and Roberts (1988) if researchers have to engage in the competing tasks of 
pursuing quantity and quality. Since the quantity aspect of inventive activities can be objectively and 
precisely measured by the number of patents obtained and the actual economic value of patents are 
hard to evaluate, firms tend to rely more on the quantity measure when allocating resources which 
leads researchers to distort their effort allocation to produce more patents at the cost of lower quality. 
The correlation between high rating of reputation and the value of invention shown in column 1 in 
Table 3 has a natural interpretation: employee-inventors who care greatly about their own reputations 
may focus more on high value projects with longer time horizons. But, it is also possible that 
inventors who have produced highly valuable inventions care more about maintaining their 
reputation. Thus, the direction of causality is not so easily determined.  
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Of course, motivations are not the sole determinants of output. Other inventor and projects 
characteristics that affect R&D productivity (Nagaoka and Owan 2011) include: 
  Amount of human resources allocated. The number of researchers and man-months is 
significantly associated with both the number of patents generated and their quality.   
  Experience. Older and thus more experienced researchers produce more patents and more 
valuable ones. The same is true of more educated researchers (i.e., PhDs). 
  Firm size and project launch departments. Projects in large firms with more than 500 
employees and those initiated in R&D units produce more patents but not significantly more 
valuable patents than projects in smaller firms or in non-R&D business units. 
  Groundbreaking opportunity. Projects aimed at developing new business lines or exploiting 
new emerging technologies generate more patents. 
As mentioned earlier, the self-selection problem may be causing the apparent association 
between the intrinsic motivation and the R&D performance. One possibility is that promising 
projects may attract more resources including researchers with high intrinsic motivation and 
technical expertise and thus account for the high ratings of SCIENCE and CHALLENGE. In order to 
account for the level of a firm’s expectations of a project’s value, we included an additional input 
measure, the logarithm of man-months, collected by the RIETI survey. When a firm expects a project 
to generate a lot of valuable knowledge and inventions, it will allocate many researchers for a long 
period of time. Therefore the man-month measure should be correlated with a firm’s ex ante or 
interim evaluation of a project. If self-selection is the primary reason behind the significant  
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correlation of SCIENCE and CHALLENGE with R&D productivity, including the man-month 
measure in the model ought to reduce their coefficients. Column 2 of Table 2 shows that SCIENCE 
is slightly less associated with the number of patents after including the man-month measure but the 
decline in the coefficient is rather limited. Furthermore, the change in the coefficient for 
CHALLENGE is negligible. Column 2 of Table 3 also implies that the strong association between 
patent value and intrinsic motives is not affected by the inclusion of the man-month measure. These 
results are not consistent with the conjecture that projects expected to be more valuable attract more 
researchers with high SCIENCE and CHALLENGE scores.   
Another possible source of self-selection is that certain types of firms offer more favorable 
research environments that attract intrinsically motivated researchers and also raise their R&D 
productivity. In Column 3 of both Tables 2 and 3, we include three firm characteristics 
measures—firm age, total sales, and overseas sales ratio—as independent variables.
1  To the extent 
to which these variables are correlated with a firm’s ability to provide a good research environment, 
we will be able to mitigate the effect of the above form of self-selection. Furthermore, in column 4 of 
both tables, we use the firm fixed effect to examine how the within-firm variations of motivation 
variables are associated with the R&D productivity measures. In this way, we can rule out any 
endogeneity effect caused by unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics. As shown in the tables, 
the estimated coefficients of SCIENCE and CHALLENGE are robust to the inclusion of firm 
                                                 
1  We initially included more firm characteristics such as growth rate, R&D intensity, capital intensity, advertising 
intensity, and female employee ratios, but none of those variables had significant coefficients and are therefore omitted.  
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characteristics measures or the firm fixed effects, implying that the possible bias in the estimation 
due to the endogeneity of motivation variables may have limited significance. 
 
b.  Why is SCIENCE highly correlated with inventor productivity?  
Researchers in industries may have an intrinsic preference for contributing to the 
accumulation of scientific knowledge and for receiving recognition from their peers for discoveries. 
Stern (2004) calls it “taste” for science. A number of economists have noted that there is a high 
correlation between the science orientation of an individual and his R&D productivity.
2 There  are 
three explanations for this correlation. First, early access to scientific discoveries may raise a 
researcher’s R&D productivity by encouraging him to explore scientific frontiers to find solutions or 
by guiding him to technological fields where more by-products and applications are expected. In 
short, learning from scientific literature and academic communities should improve a researcher’s 
opportunity for serendipitous discovery as well as his absorptive capacity. Second, interest in science 
may be simply correlated with a researcher’s ability. In this case, although the “taste for science” 
could be a good screening measure for employers, the direct causality between intrinsic motivation 
and performance becomes superficial. Third, researchers with a strong “taste for science” are more 
willing to take riskier exploratory approaches and put in long hours to conquer challenges.   
                                                 
2  See Arora and Gambardella (1994), Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990), Gambadella et al.(2006), Rosenberg (1989) , 
Sauermann and Cohen (2010), Stephan (1996), and Stern (2004).  
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Note that the high correlation between science orientation and R&D productivity may 
confound the “learning,” “ability,” and “motivation” explanations.
3  Rich information in the RIETI 
survey on research activities and inventors’ characteristics help us to distinguish these different 
explanations. If the “learning” aspect is important, interaction with a scientific community, reading 
scientific and technical literature, and publishing in academic journals should help to raise inventor 
productivity. Table 4 shows the estimation results for the same econometric model as in Tables 2 and 
3 but with a set of variables indicating the levels of participation in academic research activities and   
utilization of academic research output. It shows that the data do not offer strong support for the 
“learning” explanation. First of all, patent value is lower for those with co-inventors from 
universities. This is inconsistent with the view that cooperation with a scientific community will raise 
R&D productivity. Second, all variables related to staying current with scientific discoveries except 
for publishing in academic journals are insignificant in explaining patent value. Third, the coefficient 
for SCIENCE does not decline much when we add the above variables in estimation. These findings 
indicate that the “learning” effect explains at most only a portion of the overall relationship between 
a “taste” for science and R&D productivity, and the effect is especially limited for the patent value.   
We next examine whether unobserved ability is generating the apparent correlation between 
interest in science and R&D performance. In order to do so, we use the information of which schools 
the inventors graduated assuming that a researcher’s educational background signals his innate 
ability. Table 5 presents the results for estimating the same ordered logit models as before but with 
                                                 
3  See Rosenberg (1989), Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990), and Arora and Gambardella (1994) for similar arguments.  
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the school fixed effect. The schools which have fewer than three graduates in the dataset are omitted. 
As you see in Table 5, the estimated coefficients for motivation variables change little after including 
the school fixed effect implying that unobserved ability is unlikely to be causing the observed 
relationship between the importance of intrinsic motivation and R&D activity. 
Given the analysis so far it would be reasonable to expect that intrinsically motivated 
individuals are more productive primarily because they are motivated to choose valuable projects and 
put forth sufficient effort to overcome challenges. Unfortunately, we cannot present strong evidence 
for this motivation story. Instead, we have developed a principal-agent model which is consistent 
with this motivation story and derived a number of empirical implications from the model. 
 
V  Theoretical Model 
In order to illustrate how extrinsic rewards could influence the actions of inventors, we 
present a very simple principal-agent model where the agent-employee chooses the type of project 
and the level of efforts. All proofs are in the appendix. Suppose employees must choose between two 
R&D opportunities that could potentially generate the firm profit Y. Project 1 is more exploratory 
and riskier but could potentially lead to many inventions that can be successfully commercialized. 
Project 2 is more incremental and safer (i.e., expected to succeed with high probability) but could 
only result in marginal improvement over the current technology. The principal-firm cannot observe 
which project each employee chooses. After choosing the project, each employee chooses the level 
of effort that determines the probability of success. For simplicity, we assume that they choose either  
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high effort,  e E  , or low effort,  0  E . When employees choose  e E  , Projects 1 and 2 generate 
profit Y = Y1 > 0 and Y = Y2 > 0 with probability p1 and p2, respectively, and Y = 0 otherwise. When 
an employee chooses  0  E , the project inevitably fails and Y = 0.  
Employees enjoy non-pecuniary personal benefits with the expected value uE from 
executing each project where u =u1 for Project 1 and u u2 for Project 2.  is the parameter of the 
strength of intrinsic motivation and varies across employees but cannot be observed by the firm.
4 
We assume that  is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The assumption that the intrinsic 
benefits depend on the level of efforts reflects our perception that an intrinsically motivated 
individual collects some non-pecuniary benefits from engaging in activities because he feels 
competent and self-determining. Such innate rewards should be greater when he exerts more effort to 
control the process.   
In addition to the intrinsic motive, the firm can provide the employees with monetary 
incentive  ) (Y w w  . We assume that there is a liquidity constraint with  0  w  where  the  minimum 
wage is normalized at 0 so that w(0) = 0. In accordance with the characteristic differences between 
Project 1 and Project 2 described above, we make the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1: Y1 > Y2, p1 < p2, u1 > u2. 
The employee’s utility is linear and additive as a function of intrinsic and extrinsic motives 
and is defined as follows: 
[|]   UE w E u E E          ( 1 )  
                                                 
4  The benefit may be contingent on Y, but in that case you only need to redefine u as u = piui(Yi) +(1- pi) ui(0) where 
ui(Y) is the maximum non-pecuniary intrinsic benefit per unit of effort when the output is Y.  
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We assume that choosing Project 1 and exerting high effort is efficient for any , i.e., 
0 2 2 2 1 1 1       e e u Y p e e u Y p    for  all   
Assumption 2:  e Y p Y p   2 2 1 1 . 
Assumption 2 is a necessary and sufficient condition for Project 1 to be efficient for all 
employees. Although there might be a situation where pursuing a safer project is efficient in reality, 
there is no conflict of interests between the firm and the employee in such a case. In order to focus 
our attention on misalignment of interests in project selection, we impose Assumption 2. Let 
) ( 1 1 Y w w   and  ) ( 2 2 Y w w  . Then, the employee solves the following maximization problem: 
 Max  11 1 22 2 max{ , ,0} Up w u e e p w u e e           (2) 
Note that hiring employees with high  is desirable for the firm because such employees are more 
likely to exert effort given the same compensation. Since  12 ue e ue e      for  12 uu  , no 
employees choose Project 2 and put forth some effort in it in the absence of monetary incentives, 
i.e., 0 2 1   w w .  
Now first we can prove the following lemma. 
Lemma 1 For any pair of  ) , ( 2 1 w w , there exist andsuch that 1and the following 
actions are optimal for the employee: 
(i)  the employee chooses Project 1 and exerts effort if  1 (, 1 ]     
(ii)  the employee chooses Project 2 and exerts effort if  21 (,)     
(iii)  the employee chooses not to make any effort if  2 [0, )     
Proof is in the Appendix.  
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The result in Lemma 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. Now, we can state the firm’s problem in a 
simple form. 
1212
11 1 1 1 222 2
,,,
11 1 22 2 1
22 2 11 1 2 1
11 1 22 2
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )  s.t.
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   
    2 or [0, ]  
 (3)   
In studying this firm’s problem, we consider the following two scenarios: 
Case 1: Value of invention is always verifiable. 
In this case, the firm can distinguish between Y1 and Y2, and therefore chooses w1 and w2 ( 
0) optimally. 
Case 2: Value of successful invention is not verifiable.  
In this case, when the project succeeds, the firm knows that Y > 0 but cannot distinguish 
between Y1 and Y2. Therefore, the firm has to offer the same reward, 2 1 w w  , for the successful 
implementation of either project. 
In reality, R&D always has aspects of both Case 1 and Case 2. Many large Japanese firms 
pay predetermined compensation to inventors for each patent application or patent registration 
regardless of the expected value of the inventions. Therefore, at least before commercialization or 
technology licensing occurs, rewards for inventions are not differentiated. Furthermore, even when 
inventions are commercialized or licensed, inventions with varying technical significance tend to be 
treated equally because (1) a substantial amount of patents and technical know-how are used in most 
products, making it is hard to evaluate the economic value of each invention; (2) it often takes many 
years before an invention is commercially released so its final contribution to the firm’s profits can  
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only be estimated after a long period of time; and (3) cross-licensing, which is prevalent among large 
Japanese firms, often makes it unnecessary to calculate the economic value of each patent in the 
patent pool (Nagaoka and Kwon 2006). Given the complex, interdependent, and time-variant nature 
of most inventions, the measurement cost of evaluating the worth of all inventions generated every 
year would be enormous.   
On the other hand, a surge in lawsuits in late 1990s and early 2000s filed by inventors 
demanding greater compensation prompted many large Japanese firms to be paying inventors based 
on the profits, sales, or licensing revenue generated by their inventions. Most of these firms’ 
revenue-based remuneration policies primarily target highly valuable inventions with exceptional 
economic returns in a manner similar to that of Case 1. Therefore, we might see large Japanese firms 
as shifting from Case 2 to Case 1 by investing in measurement technology. In this theory section, we 
analyze how different the optimal incentive schemes in Case 1 and Case 2 are. The difference has 
some implications for how inventor productivity measures are associated with intrinsic motivation 
and how different these relationships are in Case 1 and Case 2.   
In order to simplify the derivation, we impose two more assumptions. Although these 
assumptions are not innocuous, we can greatly simplify the notation of the propositions and shorten 
the proofs by ruling out some irrelevant minor cases while maintaining empirical implications 
relevant for our analysis. 
Assumption 3:  2 u  =  0. 
Assumption 4:  12 ww    
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Without Assumption 4, the firm will choose 
**
12 ww   for  sufficiently  high  1 u   in Case 1 
because the firm can pay less to intrinsically motivated employees. This is very unlikely in reality 
because paying less to intrinsically motivated and productive employees sends the wrong message to 
the labor market and impedes hiring. 
We first analyze Case 1 where there is no constraint on feasible incentive schemes: 
Proposition 1 Suppose the firm can freely choose w1 and w2 (Case 1). Then, there are potentially 
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   will select Project 2. 
















   will choose Project 1 and work 









   will not make any efforts regardless of the project they 
choose. 
Proof is in the Appendix. 
Proposition 1 sends a clear message. When the intrinsic benefit of choosing risky and 
challenging projects is not substantially higher than that for choosing safer and less challenging ones,  
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rewarding only highly valuable successes is optimal in general. When the intrinsic benefit of 
choosing risky and challenging projects is sufficiently strong, however, the firm can cut back on 
compensation for discovering valuable inventions because motivating those with strong intrinsic 
motivation is easier thus requiring less pecuniary rewards. But, reducing the reward leads some 
portion of workers to stop exerting effort. Then, it becomes optimal to reward those who successfully 
complete safer and less valuable projects in order to encourage all workers to work hard. Therefore, 
the greater the potential intrinsic benefit is, the lower the average value of the invention (i.e., more 
employees will engage in safer projects). In other words, the intrinsic benefit supplants the monetary 
incentive lowering the overall wage level, which in turn adversely affects the incentives of the 
employees in project selection. 
Next, we will consider Case 2 where the rewards cannot be differentiated based on the profits 
generated. 
Proposition 2 Suppose the firm cannot verify Y and thus has to offer  w w w   2 1   (Case 2), then 
there exists the level of potential intrinsic benefits 
2 1 11 11
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   will not make any efforts regardless of the project they choose. 
Proof is in the Appendix. 
 
Interestingly, the greater the potential intrinsic benefits are, the more employees will choose 
Project 1, leading to a higher average invention values. This result is in contrast with Proposition 1 
where the intrinsic benefit adversely affects the average value of invention. Furthermore, when  2 p  
is sufficiently greater than  1 p  and  u1 is sufficiently small, inducing the employees to choose Project 
1 may become impossible.   
In Propositions 1 and 2, whether the value of an invention is verifiable or not is given 
exogenously. In reality, it is more or less endogenous. Suppose the firm can make a costly 
investment in valuation technology for inventions. If doing so substantially improves efficiency, the 
firm will invest and offer revenue-based compensation to R&D researchers. Putting Propositions 1 
and 2 together, we can determine when firms are more likely to offer revenue-based compensation 
for inventions. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the difference in project selection between Cases 1 and 2 
offering a few empirical implications.   
First, firms which have many employee-inventors with strong intrinsic motivation are less 
likely to adopt revenue-based compensation policy for inventors. Since many employees are already  
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motivated to choose risky and challenging projects, additional rewards will only affect marginal 
employees.  
Second, the average value of inventions should be more positively correlated with the 
strength of intrinsic motivation in the absence of revenue-based pay than its presence. Figure 4 
illustrates how the share of the workers who choose Project 1 change as the potential intrinsic 
benefits increase for both Case 1 and Case 2. The figure implies that the importance of intrinsic 
motivation and the average value of inventions should be negatively associated when the firm has 
contingent monetary compensation, whereas they are positively associated when monetary rewards 
for inventions are not revenue-based. 
 
VI  Empirical Analysis, Part 2 
In order to test the empirical implications obtained in Section V, we turn to an additional data 
source. In 2005, the Institute of Intellectual Property sponsored a survey conducted by Koichiro 
Onishi, who collected firm-level panel data on remuneration policies for employee inventions (IIP 
firm survey hereafter).
5  The survey targeted 836 manufacturing firms listed on the first section of 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange as of March 31, 2005. Among the targeted firms, 360 firms responded to 
the questionnaire (response rate: 43.1%). We use the data for 347 firms after excluding two firms 
that had not obtained any patents in the past 15 years and 11 firms that refused to answer some major 
questions. These data have two advantages. First, they contain rich information on remuneration 
                                                 
5  I thank Koichiro Onishi for generously sharing his proprietary data.  
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policies implemented at large Japanese firms including types of remunerations 
(filing/registration-based vs. revenue-based).
6  Second, the survey questionnaire asked each firm 
about the details of its remuneration policies in 1990 and when and what changes were made 
between 1990 and 2005. We can therefore construct panel data of evolving remuneration policies for 
347 major Japanese firms. 
Our first prediction is about the relationship between the incidence of revenue-based 
remuneration and the strength of intrinsic motivation. We define ppay as the incidence of 
revenue-based pay and ppay_1mil as the incidence of such policies with payout limits over ¥1 
million. The latter variable is introduced to rule out the compensation policies whose payout is so 
low that they provide little incentive to choose risky and challenging projects. We also use the 
SCIENCE variable (the importance of satisfaction from contributing to the progress of science and 
technology as a source of motivation) as a proxy for the overall strength of intrinsic motivation. Then, 
our empirical prediction can be expressed as Corr(ppay, SCIENCE) < 0. To test this hypothesis, we 
estimate the probit model using ppay or ppay_1mil as the dependent variable. 
The results are in Table 6. All models imply that larger firms (measured by the number of 
employees), firms with more technical capability (measured by the size of patent stock), and firms in 
industries with more lawsuits related to inventor remuneration are more likely to introduce 
revenue-based compensation. Although our focal variable SCIENCE is negatively associated with 
the incidence of revenue-based pay, the coefficient is not significant. 
                                                 
6  Other information collected includes types of revenue measures (sales vs. licensing vs. transfer), types of patents 
(domestic vs. foreign), payout limits, frequency of payouts, etc.  
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Table 7 shows the result for our second hypothesis. Unlike the theoretical prediction, the average 
value of patent is no more positively associated with the strength of science orientation in the 
absence of revenue-based pay than its presence. The coefficients for SCIENCE in two subsamples 
(i.e. ppay_1mil=0 and ppay_1mil=1) are not significantly different. 
The above results raise the question of why we do not find strong support for our theory. There 
are several possible reasons. First, it may be the case that a typical Japanese firm does not design its 
compensation policy for employee inventions as an incentive scheme but rather to comply with 
Section 35 of Japan’s Patent Law that requires appropriate remuneration for employee inventions. 
Owan and Onishi (2010) offer some evidence for this argument. Second, the IIP survey tells us that 
many Japanese firms reformed their invention remuneration policies after the period when most of 
the inventions targeted in the RIETI survey were discovered (in general, a few years before those 
patent applications were submitted, which means roughly between 1990-2000) . Note that inventions 
remuneration policies in the IIP survey are matched with the estimated year of inventions. This 
means that, if these changes were to improve the efficiency of the policies, the old ones we used in 
our analysis may be far from efficient. Third, our survey targets only research projects that generated 
patents and is likely to pick more successful projects because those that produced many patents are 
more likely to be included in the dataset by its design. Therefore, our sample may include mostly 
those projects where the “distortion” in project selection is relatively limited causing sample 
selection biases on the coefficient estimates.    . Fourth, it may be the case that firms have sufficient 





Our study reveals that two intrinsic motives--satisfaction from contributing to science and 
technology “taste for science”, and interests in solving challenging technical problems “taste for 
challenge”--are more important determinants for the inventor productivity than any other motives. 
Although it is sometimes argued that hiring those with strong science orientation can increase the 
learning capacity of the firm, we cannot find any strong support for this learning capacity 
explanation. We neither find the evidence for the possibility that the inventors with strong intrinsic 
motivation are likely to have higher innate capability thus creating the correlation between the 
importance of intrinsic motivation and the R&D productivity.   
The study also explores for the possible linkage between monetary compensation and intrinsic 
motivation. Our theoretical model implies that monetary compensation which generally induces 
more efforts may “distort” the selection of a project away from the set of “challenging” and 
potentially more desirable projects (i.e. the employees who otherwise are more inclined to choose 
riskier projects encouraged by their intrinsic benefits may choose safer projects that give the 
employees a better chance of getting the reward). The model offers two testable empirical 
implications. First, firms which have many employee-inventors with strong intrinsic motivation are 
less likely to adopt revenue-based compensation policy for inventors. Second, the average value of 
inventions is more positively correlated with the strength of intrinsic motivation in the absence of 
revenue-based pay than its presence. The reason for the second implication is that the hazard and  
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degree of project selection distortion, which reduces the average value of inventions, is smaller as the 
potential intrinsic benefits get greater when the value of the invention is not verifiable but such 
relationship could be reversed when the value of the invention is verifiable.   
In order to test these hypotheses, we combined the RIETI inventor survey with the IIP firm 
survey, which contains detailed information about the invention remuneration policies instituted by 
large Japanese firms. Our empirical analysis failed to support the above implications. There are a 
number of possible explanations. First, the assumption of optimal contracting may be unrealistic 
because firms often adopt invention remuneration policies simply to comply with the Japan’s Patent 
Law and the data collected are in the period when a majority of firms were reforming their policies 
substantially (thus, less likely to be perceived as optimal). Second, our data collection method may 
have systematically selected more successful projects which were less likely to be affected by 
distortion in project selection.   
Further investigation of possible interaction between intrinsic motivation and monetary 
incentives for R&D employees is desirable given that there has been little empirical research on the 
productivity impact of incentives at the individual level in the R&D function. The topic is especially 
important in Japan where a rapid increase in the payout of invention remuneration has been observed 




Proof of Lemma 1  
Lemma 1 can be restated in the following format: 
For any pair of  ) , ( 2 1 w w , there exist andsuch that 1and  
(i)  11 1 22 2 max{ ,0} p wu e e p wu e e      for  any 1 (, 1 ]     
(ii)  22 2 11 1 max{ ,0} p wu e e p wu e e       for  any 21 (,)      
(iii)  11 1 22 2 0m a x { , } p wu e e p wu e e        for  any 2 [0, )    . 
Suppose inequality (i) holds for a certain . Then for any ' > , (i) is satisfied because  12 uu  . 
Let  1 inf{ |(i) is satisfied}    . Then inequality (i) holds for any 1 (, 1 ]      but not for any 
1 [0, ]    . If (i) does not hold for any , let  1 1   . Since no  satisfies  (1,1]  , the condition (i) 
still holds. Similarly, suppose inequality (iii) holds for . Then for any ' < , (iii) is satisfied. Let 
 2 sup{ | iii  is satisfied}   . Then inequality (iii) holds for any 2 [0, )      but not for any 
2 [, 1 ]    .  Again,  let  2 1    when  no   satisfies (iii). 
Since inequalities (i) and (iii) do not hold at the same time except when both are satisfied with 
equality, . If <, for any  21 (,)    ,  11 1 22 2 max{ ,0} p wu e e p wu e e        and 
11 1 22 2 0m a x { , } p wu e e p wu e e       , which imply that  22 2 11 1 max{ ,0} p wu e e p wu e e       . 
This concludes the proof.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1   
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  is 
sufficient to induce all workers to work hard (i.e. 11 1 22 max{ , } 0 pw ue e pw e     ) while paying 
more will simply encourage more workers to choose Project 2 over Project 1.   
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It is easily seen that the second-order condition holds.    Therefore, 
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   will not make any efforts regardless of the project they 
choose. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
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   simply reduces the share of the 
employees who choose Project 1 over Project 2 without any merit for the employers. Therefore, the 
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We can easily show that 
1
1 () u    is increasing and concave in  1 u  while 
2
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Table  A  Educational  Background 
Education Level  Freq.  Percent 
High School or lower  432  8.25 
Technical School or 2-year College  283  5.4 
Bachelor 2,283  43.59 
Master 1,627  31.06 
PhD 613  11.7 
Total 5,238  100 
Inventors who are surveyed twice are counted twice. 
 
Table  B  Gender 
Gender Freq.  Percent 
Men 5,179  98.42% 
Women 83  1.58% 
Total 5,262 100% 
 
Table  C  Affiliation 
Employer Type  Freq.  Percent 
Large firms (>500 employees)  4,231 80.3% 
Medium firms (101-500 employees)  472 9.0% 
Small firms (≤100 employees)  271 5.1% 
Higher education institutions  108 2.1% 
National research labs  26 0.5% 
Municipal research labs  10 0.2% 
Non-for-profit organizations  6 0.1% 
Other government agencies  4 0.1% 
Self-employed  114 2.2% 
Others  25 0.5% 
Total 5,267  100.0%  
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Table D    Stage of Research 
   Freq.  Percent 
Basic Research  1,109  21.1% 
Applied Research    1,967  37.5% 
Development 3,455  65.8% 
Technical Service  459  8.7% 
Others 93  1.8% 
Total 5,250  100.0% 
Total does not sum up to 100% because some projects span 
multiple stages 
 
Table  E  Business  Function 
   Freq.  Percent 
Independent R&D units  3,353  67.6% 
R&D function attached to operational units  727  14.6% 
R&D units of unknown affiliation  80  1.6% 
Production 311  6.3% 
Software development  149  3.0% 
Other function  343  6.9% 






Table 1 Correlation Among Motivational Factors 
     Science   Challenge 
Org.  
Performance 
Career Reputation    Environment  Money 
Science   1                 
Challenge   0.4346   1               
Org.  Performance   0.1009   0.1365   1             
Career   0.2334   0.177   0.3243   1           
Reputation   0.2982   0.1953   0.2491   0.5897  1         
Environment  0.3183   0.1672   0.2649   0.4644  0.5229   1      
Money   0.1864   0.1058   0.1635   0.4146  0.4514  0.4627  1 
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Table 2 Ordered Logit Regression for the Number of Patents Generated 
        Dependent variable: Pat_num (# of patents expected) 
   Base  With man-month indicator  With firm characteristics  With firm fixed effect 
Independent variables     Coefficient  S.E. Coefficient  S.E. Coefficient  S.E. Coefficient  S.E. 
Project size  ln(# of inventors)  0.210   *** 0.050    -0.005    0.052    0.016    0.061    0.093    0.074   
  ln(# of applicants)  -0.262   ** 0.126    -0.276   ** 0.128            
Female  0.289    0.245    0.255    0.275    0.382    0.318    0.346    0.330    Basic inventor 
characteristics   ln(age)  0.837   *** 0.143    0.833   *** 0.145    0.767   *** 0.178    1.084   *** 0.205   
High school diploma  -0.089    0.114    -0.031    0.117    -0.173    0.143    0.061    0.168    Educational 
background  Two-year college  0.112    0.121    0.204   * 0.122    0.215    0.164    0.254    0.180   
Master’s degree  0.261   *** 0.070    0.278   *** 0.070    0.192   ** 0.082    0.184   ** 0.092    (base: college 
graduates)  PhD  0.387   *** 0.105    0.366   *** 0.106    0.212   * 0.127    0.435   *** 0.140   
Organization  Private firm (250 < emp ≤  500)  -0.456   ***  0.121   -0.491   ***  0.126              
Private firm (100 < emp ≤  250)  -0.630   ***  0.143   -0.613   ***  0.151               (base: private firm w. 
employment > 500)  Private firm (emp ≤ 100)  -0.332   ** 0.150    -0.396   *** 0.152            
 Universities -0.775   *** 0.266    -0.730   *** 0.264            
Function  R&D unit in business  -0.363   *** 0.117    -0.277   ** 0.120    -0.482   *** 0.145    -0.534   *** 0.167   
Production  -0.638   *** 0.185    -0.496   *** 0.190    -0.407    0.256    -0.478   * 0.264    (base: independent 
R&D)  Software development  -0.294   ** 0.126    -0.198    0.127    -0.297   * 0.163    -0.388   ** 0.178   
Objective  Reinforcing non-core business  -0.085    0.081    -0.115    0.081    -0.162   * 0.095    -0.104    0.108   
Developing new business  0.446   *** 0.074    0.396   *** 0.073    0.383   *** 0.088    0.467   *** 0.098    (base: reinforcing core
business)  Expanding technological base  -0.083    0.117    0.003    0.120    0.077    0.150    -0.027    0.158   
Nature Seeds-oriented  0.247   *** 0.070    0.214   *** 0.070    0.143   * 0.084    0.290   *** 0.092   
(base: needs-oriented) Exploration for seeds  0.096    0.094    0.133    0.096    0.190    0.120    0.313   ** 0.127   
Firm characteristics  ln(firm age)          0.183    0.162        
 ln(sales)          0.124   *** 0.023        
  Overseas sales ratio          0.439   ** 0.190        
Man-months ln(man-month)      0.449   *** 0.026    0.433   *** 0.030    0.507   *** 0.034   
Science  0.182    ***  0.032    0.154    ***  0.033    0.154    ***  0.040    0.180    ***  0.044    Sources of 
motivation  Challendge  0.120    ***  0.043    0.108    **  0.044    0.085      0.053    0.107    *  0.058   
  Org_perfromance  0.042      0.032    0.009      0.033    -0.022      0.040    -0.039      0.045   
  Career  -0.013      0.035    -0.009      0.035    -0.024      0.043    -0.005      0.048   
  Reputation  0.033      0.037    0.013      0.037    0.003      0.045    -0.001      0.051   
  Budget  0.109    ***  0.035    0.109    ***  0.035    0.130    ***  0.041    0.114    **  0.047   
    Money  0.010        0.034    0.019        0.034    -0.012        0.040    -0.015        0.044   
Firm fixed effect    No   No   No   Yes  
# of observations  .  4723   4699   3339   3500  
Log pseudolikelihood   6087.28   -5858.92   -4194.88   -4203.73  
Pseudo R
2       0.0574   0.087    0.0845   0.1383    
Note: All models control for application year and technology class (US subcategories) fixed effects. The following control variables are not reported in the table: status (employed, 
self-employed, student), organizational types other than firms and universities, stages (basic, applied, or development), invention types (product or process).  
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Table 3 Ordered Logit Regression for the Relative Economic Value of Patents 
        Dependent variable: Pat_val (# of patents expected) 
    Base  With man-month indicator  With firm characteristics  With firm fixed effect 
Independent variables    Coefficient  S.E. Coefficient  S.E. Coefficient  S.E. Coefficient  S.E. 
Project size  ln(# of inventors)  0.270    ***  0.056    0.183   ***  0.057   0.246   ***  0.067   0.216   **  0.085  
  ln(#  of  applicants)  0.075     0.151   0.073     0.151              
Female  -0.326     0.277   -0.341     0.293   0.097     0.284   -0.159     0.327   Basic inventor 
characteristics   ln(age)  0.663   ***  0.173   0.682   ***  0.174   0.736   ***  0.214   0.793   ***  0.253  
High school diploma  0.291    **  0.122    0.329    ***  0.123   0.193     0.147   0.141     0.185   Educational 
background  Two-year  college  -0.018     0.154   0.027     0.152   0.113     0.200   0.209     0.231  
Master’s  degree  0.062     0.080   0.049     0.081   0.072     0.095   0.053     0.112   (base: college 
graduates)  PhD  0.432   ***  0.125   0.393   ***  0.125   0.271   *  0.152   0.470   ***  0.175  
Organization  Private firm (250 < emp ≤  500)   0.043     0.140   0.023     0.142              
Private firm (100 < emp ≤  250)   -0.144     0.201   -0.144     0.205               (base: private firm w. 
employment > 500)  Private firm (emp ≤  100)  0.495   ***  0.183   0.452   **  0.187              
  Universities  -0.428     0.274   -0.419     0.274              
Function  R&D unit in business  0.004      0.147    0.039     0.149   0.000     0.189   0.087     0.207  
Production  0.144     0.211   0.176     0.214   0.303     0.271   0.216     0.274   (base: independent 
R&D)  Software  development  0.090     0.147   0.127     0.150   0.065     0.183   0.381   *  0.222  
Objective  Reinforcing noncore business  -0.236    **  0.099    -0.238   **  0.099   -0.339   ***  0.119   -0.343   **  0.144  
Developing  new  business  0.042     0.086   0.005     0.087   -0.062     0.103   -0.058     0.120   (base: reinforcing 
core business)  Expanding technological base  -0.315   **  0.132   -0.257   *  0.134   -0.387   **  0.175   -0.402   **  0.185  
Nature  Seeds-oriented  0.031     0.082   0.014     0.082   0.017     0.100   -0.066     0.113  
(base: needs-oriented)Exploration for seeds  0.021      0.104   0.027     0.106   -0.034     0.131   -0.050     0.146  
Firm characteristics  ln(firm age)              0.216      0.172         
  ln(sales)        -0.057    **  0.026       
  Overseas sales ratio              -0.259      0.215         
Man-months  ln(manmonth)        0.188   ***  0.027   0.167   ***  0.033   0.206   ***  0.036  
Science  0.295   ***  0.039   0.289   ***  0.040   0.249   ***  0.047   0.308   ***  0.054   Sources of 
motivation  Challenge  0.273   ***  0.054   0.271   ***  0.055   0.239   ***  0.065   0.430   ***  0.077  
  Org_perfromance  -0.016     0.041   -0.030     0.041   0.011     0.052   -0.055     0.058  
  Career  0.038     0.043   0.036     0.043   0.002     0.055   0.007     0.063  
  Reputation  0.123   ***  0.044   0.116   ***  0.045   0.114   **  0.057   0.106     0.065  
  Budget  -0.010     0.041   -0.011     0.041   0.026     0.049   0.025     0.055  
   Money  0.020        0.040   0.024       0.040   0.037       0.048   0.065      0.054   
Firm fixed effect    No    No    No    Yes   
# of observations  .  3454    3433    2431    2599   
Log pseudolikelihood   -4177.02    -4125.94   -2909.29   -2835.66  
Pseudo R
2       0.0616   0.0679   0.0577   0.1421  
Note: All models control for application year and technology class (US subcathegories) fixed effects. The following control variables are not reported in the table: status (employed, 
self-employed, student), organizational types other than firms and universities, stages (basic, applied, or development), invention types (product or process).  
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Table 4 R&D Productivity and the Utilization of Academic Research Output   
Ordered logit model  Dependent variable  Pat_num (# of patents expected)  Pat_val (relative economic value) 
    Base  With academic activities  Base  With academic activities 
Independent variables    Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E. 
Project size  ln(# of inventors)  -0.005      0.052    -0.021     0.053   0.183   ***  0.057   0.164   ***  0.059  
  ln(#  of  applicants)  -0.276   **  0.128   -0.334   **  0.133   0.073     0.151   0.016     0.158  
Female  0.255     0.275   0.226     0.282   -0.341     0.293   -0.452     0.292   Basic inventor 
characteristics   ln(age)  0.833   ***  0.145   0.806   ***  0.149   0.682   ***  0.174   0.592   ***  0.181  
High school diploma  -0.031      0.117    -0.040      0.123   0.329   ***  0.123   0.361   ***  0.129   Educational 
background  Two-year  college  0.204   *  0.122   0.113     0.124   0.027     0.152   0.010     0.158  
Master’s  degree  0.278   ***  0.070   0.233   ***  0.071   0.049     0.081   0.007     0.082   (base: college 
graduates)  PhD  0.366   ***  0.106   0.237   **  0.110   0.393   ***  0.125   0.235   *  0.129  
Organization  Private firm (250 < emp £ 500)    -0.491    ***  0.126   -0.484   ***  0.132   0.023     0.142   0.049     0.149  
Private firm (100 < emp £ 250)    -0.613    ***  0.151    -0.575   ***  0.154   -0.144     0.205   -0.102     0.216   (base: private firm 
with emp > 500)  Private firm (emp £ 100)  -0.396    ***  0.152    -0.288   *  0.154   0.452   **  0.187   0.478   **  0.190  
  Universities  -0.730   ***  0.264   -0.741   ***  0.275   -0.419     0.274   -0.612   **  0.303  
Function  R&D unit in business  -0.277    **  0.120    -0.210     0.137   0.039     0.149   -0.085     0.170  
Production  -0.496   ***  0.190   -0.387   *  0.201   0.176     0.214   0.091     0.228   (base: independent 
R&D)  Software  development  -0.198     0.127   -0.130     0.144   0.127     0.150   0.085     0.170  
Objective  Reinforcing noncore business  -0.115      0.081    -0.098     0.083   -0.238   **  0.099   -0.262   ***  0.100  
Developing new business  0.396    ***  0.073   0.377   ***  0.075   0.005     0.087   -0.002     0.088   (base: reinforcing core 
business)  Expanding technological base  0.003      0.120    0.010     0.123   -0.257   *  0.134   -0.282   **  0.139  
Nature  Seeds-oriented  0.214   ***  0.070   0.205   ***  0.071   0.014     0.082   0.005     0.084  
(base: needs-oriented) Exploration for seeds  0.133      0.096   0.146     0.098   0.027     0.106   0.064     0.110  
Independent  R&D  unit     0.065     0.082       -0.064     0.094    Interactions with 
academic communities Co-inventors from universities        -0.330   *  0.197         0.069     0.208  
  Collaboration  with  universities     0.155     0.135       -0.045     0.150   
(for getting ideas)  Importance of science literature     0.019     0.028       -0.026     0.034   
  Importance  of  universities    0.064    *  0.035       0.032     0.038   
Importance of science literature        0.032     0.026         0.004     0.032   (for implementing 
ideas)  Importance  of  universities       -0.010     0.035       -0.029     0.038   
  Published the discovery in journals       0.348    ***  0.084          0.728    ***  0.097   
Man-month ln(manmonth)  0.449   *** 0.026    0.430   *** 0.027    0.188   *** 0.027    0.165   *** 0.028   
Sources of motivation Science  0.154    ***  0.033    0.127    ***  0.034    0.289    ***  0.040    0.278    ***  0.041   
  Challenge  0.108    **  0.044    0.094    **  0.045    0.271    ***  0.055    0.262    ***  0.056   
  Org_perfromance  0.009     0.033    0.017     0.034    -0.030     0.041    -0.026     0.042   
  Career  -0.009     0.035    -0.005     0.036    0.036     0.043    0.051     0.044   
  Reputation  0.013     0.037    -0.005     0.038    0.116    ***  0.045    0.094    **  0.046   
  Budget  0.109    ***  0.035    0.084    **  0.036    -0.011     0.041    -0.017     0.042   
    Money  0.019        0.034    0.013        0.034    0.024        0.040    0.030        0.041   
# of observations  .  4699    4545    3433    3319   
Note: All models control for application year and technology class (US subcategories) fixed effects. The following control variables are not reported in the table: status (employed, 
self-employed, student), organizational types other than firms and universities, stages (basic, applied, or development), invention types (product or process).  
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Table 5 R&D Productivity Estimation Controlling for Inventor Ability 
Ordered logit model  Dependent variable  Pat_num (# of patents expected)  Pat_val (relative economic value) 
  
Base (restricted to college 
graduates or higher) 
With FE dummies for college 
the inventor graduated 
Base (restricted to college 
graduates or higher) 
With FE dummies for college 
the inventor graduated 
Independent variables   Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E. 
Project size  ln(# of inventors)  -0.019     0.055   -0.024     0.059   0.198   ***  0.061   0.220   ***  0.064  
  ln(#  of  applicants)  -0.322   **  0.137   -0.319   **  0.145   0.056     0.161   0.059     0.179  
Female  0.302     0.289   0.279     0.314   -0.380     0.327   -0.248     0.384   Basic inventor 
characteristics   ln(age)  0.832   ***  0.161   0.754   ***  0.172   0.740   ***  0.188   0.869   ***  0.206  
Master’s  degree  0.282   ***  0.070   0.247   ***  0.078   0.047     0.081   0.149     0.095   Educational 
background  PhD  0.366   ***  0.108   0.374   ***  0.120   0.398   ***  0.125   0.498   ***  0.141  
Organization  Private firm (250 < emp £ 500)    -0.563    ***  0.134   -0.603   ***  0.145   0.063     0.162   0.077     0.180  
Private firm (100 < emp £ 250)    -0.531   ***  0.173   -0.587   ***  0.191   -0.075     0.236   -0.112     0.261   (base: private firm 
with emp > 500)  Private firm (emp £ 100)  -0.461    ***  0.170    -0.410   **  0.188   0.121     0.194   0.131     0.214  
  Universities  -0.737   ***  0.267   -0.709   **  0.277   -0.543   **  0.276   -0.568   **  0.285  
Function  R&D unit in business  -0.240    *  0.144    -0.177     0.157   0.044     0.180   -0.006     0.197  
Production  -0.504   **  0.218   -0.466   *  0.239   0.212     0.238   0.193     0.276   (base: independent 
R&D)  Software  development  -0.097     0.142   -0.129     0.152   0.109     0.166   0.119     0.184  
Objective  Reinforcing non-core business  -0.165    *  0.089    -0.171   *  0.093   -0.255   **  0.108   -0.278   **  0.115  
Reinforcing other existing business -0.073      0.161    -0.114     0.167   -0.105     0.193   -0.172     0.209   (base: reinforcing core 
business)  Developing new business  0.396    ***  0.078   0.387   ***  0.082   -0.028     0.092   -0.015     0.097  
  Expanding technological base  -0.006      0.127    -0.082     0.135   -0.287   **  0.144   -0.310   **  0.158  
Nature  Seeds-oriented  0.185   **  0.074   0.213   ***  0.079   -0.036     0.087   -0.070     0.092  
(base: needs-oriented) Exploration for seeds  0.187    *  0.104   0.180     0.111   0.023     0.116   0.016     0.126  
Man-months  ln(manmonth)  0.470   ***  0.028   0.478   ***  0.029   0.186   ***  0.029   0.179   ***  0.031  
Science  0.141    ***  0.036    0.138    ***  0.038    0.288    ***  0.042    0.291    ***  0.045   
Sources of motivation
Challendge  0.125    ***  0.048    0.120    **  0.050    0.258    ***  0.059    0.248    ***  0.064   
  Org_perfromance  0.008     0.036    0.004     0.038    -0.077    *  0.044    -0.053     0.047   
  Career  0.011     0.038    0.003     0.039    0.047     0.047    0.050     0.050   
  Reputation  0.013     0.040    0.017     0.042    0.114    **  0.047    0.122    **  0.051   
  Budget  0.106    ***  0.038    0.106    ***  0.040    -0.010     0.043    -0.031     0.047   
    Money  0.016        0.037    0.028        0.039    0.030        0.043    0.033        0.045   
# of observations  .  4103    3949    3034    2927   
Log pseudolikelihood   -5158.07   -4906.34   -3662.48   -3444.46   
Pseudo R
2       0.0889   0.1006   0.0662    0.0891   
Note: All models control for application year and technology class (US subcategories) fixed effects. The following control variables are not reported in the table: status (employed, 
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Table 6 Intrinsic Motivation and Incidence of Revenue-based Pay 
Probit Model                 
Dependent Variable  ppay  ppay  ppay_1mil  ppay_1mil 




No or higher-than- 
¥1million limit for 
payment 
No or higher-than- 
¥1million limit for 
payment 
ln(# of employees)  0.5971    ***  0.6021   ***  0.3088   ***  0.3070   *** 
 (0.1161)    (0.1146)    (0.1007)    (0.0999)   
ln(patent  stock)  0.1671   ***  0.1664   ***  0.0289     0.0306    
 (0.0552)    (0.0551)    (0.0430)    (0.0430)   
# of lawsuit cases  0.5083    ***  0.5154   ***  0.3410   ***  0.3411   *** 
 (0.1069)    (0.1076)    (0.0880)    (0.0874)   
Sources of motivation                 
Science  -0.0644     -0.0521     -0.0103     -0.0060    
 (0.0448)    (0.0432)    (0.0347)    (0.0399)   
Challenge     (0.0101)        -0.0090     
     (0.0583)        (0.0484)   
Org_perfromance     (0.0233)        -0.0044     
     (0.0623)        (0.0365)   
Career      -0.0450         0.0277    
     (0.0468)        (0.0431)   
Reputation      -0.1256   **      -0.0980   ** 
     (0.0589)        (0.0421)   
Budget      0.1293   **      0.0704   * 
           (0.0612)             (0.0421)     
# of observations  1848    1840      1939    1930     
Log  pseudolikelihood  -480.606     -471.475     -928.488     -920.061    
Pseudo R
2 0.3872     0.3952     0.2735     0.2756     
Note: All models include application year and technology class (US subcathegories) fixed effects. 




Table 7 Intrinsic Motivation and Revenue-Based Pay Schemes 
Ordered logit model  Dependent variable  Size_pat (# of patents expected)  Pat_value (relative economic value) 
  Sample: substantial revenue-based 
reward  Yes No  Yes  No 
Independent variables  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient  S.E.  Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Female  1.163   **  0.465  -1.216    0.822  -0.459     0.411  0.131     0.695   Basic inventor 
characteristics   ln(age)  1.236   *** 0.312  0.793   *  0.427  1.468   ***  0.293  0.751   *  0.400  
High  school  diploma  0.077     0.302  0.740     0.616  0.679   **  0.332  0.334     0.404   Educational 
background  Two-year  college  0.003     0.221  0.941   *** 0.359  0.379     0.237  0.115     0.308  
Master’s  degree  0.231     0.224  1.127   *** 0.354  0.519   **  0.240  0.351     0.311   (base: college 
graduates)  PhD  0.414     0.286  1.149   *** 0.382  0.702   **  0.303  0.430     0.375  
Function  Belong  to  R&D  unit   0.781   *** 0.175  -0.035    0.248  0.116     0.171  0.555   **  0.261  
Objective  Reinforcing existing business  -0.514  *** 0.131  -0.432 ** 0.194 -0.126      0.130  -0.098     0.175  
Expanding technological base  -0.759  *** 0.257  -0.684 *  0.349 -0.825    ***  0.238  -0.311     0.327   (base: developing new 
business)  Others  1.093     0.695  -2.141  *** 0.627  -0.534     1.043  -1.340   ***  0.496  
Nature  Seeds-oriented  0.229   *  0.137  0.248     0.200  -0.244   *  0.140  0.616   ***  0.186  
(base: needs-oriented) Exploration for seeds  0.107      0.176 0.913   *** 0.296 0.007     0.188  0.023     0.269  
Stages  Basic  0.037     0.163  0.663   *** 0.203  0.108     0.167  0.452   **  0.215  
Applied   0.298   **  0.131  0.359   **  0.169  0.325   ***  0.123  0.421   **  0.176   (base: development 
only)  Development  0.062     0.145  0.570   *** 0.188  0.255   *  0.130  0.466   **  0.196  
  Technical  Service  -0.010    0.210  0.178     0.259  0.153     0.249  0.948   ***  0.271  
Firm  characteristics  ln(sales)  0.158   *** 0.052  0.233   *** 0.080  -0.038     0.050  0.067     0.063  
  ln(patent  stock)  -0.135  *** 0.046  0.046     0.088  0.042     0.048  0.014     0.073  
Project size  ln(# of inventors)  -0.009    0.029  -0.037    0.046  0.114    ***  0.034  0.050      0.041   
  ln(manmonth)  1.566   *** 0.143  1.200   *** 0.201  0.462   ***  0.130  0.440   **  0.178  
Sources of 
motivation  Science  0.254   *** 0.059  0.071       0.081  0.373   ***  0.054  0.294   ***  0.075  
# of observations  .  1299  721  1299  722   
Log  pseudolikelihood   -1639.41   -916.49   -1861.29   -1014.98  
Pseudo R
2     0.1043  0.1081  0.0652    0.0693 
Note: All models control for application year and technology class (US subcathegories) fixed effects.           
substantial revenue-based reward means revenue-based compensation with no or higher-than-\1milion limit for annual payment      
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